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 1 
1 Introduction 
1.1 Presentation of the Topic 
The signing of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR) in 1948 was a 
significant moment for general state recognition of human rights, and began an era of 
increasing worldwide attention to respecting and protecting human rights everywhere. 
When the UN Charter and the UDHR were written, states were responsible for most 
international relationships. As the world economy has globalized, non-state actors, such as 
corporations, have become more active on the international level; indeed, one could argue 
that most international relations now happen through corporate activity. Because of this, 
corporate responsibility and accountability have become important issues in international 
law over the last few decades.
1
 States have an obligation to promote human rights within 
their jurisdiction, both by directly respecting them and by ensuring that their subjects 
respect the rights of one another.
2
 In addition, the states could go further and protect and 
promote human rights through enacting regulations on their corporations, requiring that 
they demonstrate human rights responsibility not only at home but also abroad, by 
complying with human rights norms and by demanding the same of their subcontractors, 
suppliers and other business partners.
3
  
 
The discussion about corporate human rights responsibility and states’ responsibility to 
protect against corporate violations of human rights at home and abroad has escalated in 
the past few years. International organizations have developed voluntary codes for 
transnational corporations, such as the OECD Guidelines for Multi-National Enterprises 
                                                
1
 Alston (2005), Addo (1999), Joseph (2004), Ratner (2001), Ruggie (2008) et al. 
2
 ICCPR art. 2.1, ICESCR art. 2.1 
3
 Beyond Voluntarism (2006) ICHRP, Vasquez (2005) 
 2 
(MNEs) and the UN Global Compact, encouraging MNEs and their subsidiaries to respect 
and protect human rights, but little attention has been given to the human rights 
responsibilities of corporations with foreign chains of production, suppliers and 
subcontractors. In April 2008 the Special Representative of the Secretary-General released a 
report on the issue of human rights and transnational corporations and other business 
enterprises.4 The SRSG urged states to protect against human rights abuses by third parties5 
and to work towards achieving a “corporate culture respectful of human rights at home and 
abroad (…)”6.  
 
The call for better protection of human rights by companies abroad has also been echoed by 
the Norwegian government. In January 2009, it issued a whitepaper on Corporate Social 
Responsibility (CSR) in a globalized economy,
7
 where it is noted that Norwegian 
corporations more than ever are involved in states where the human rights protection is 
challenged or weak.
8
 The Norwegian government encourages domestic corporations to be 
socially responsible and take actions to promote human rights protection beyond what is 
required by laws and regulations, including by making similar requirements of their 
suppliers and subcontractors.
 9
 
 
Past attempts to regulate the activity of domestic corporations’ contractors abroad, 
however, have run into legal hurdles. During the Cold War, the U.S. enacted the Helms-
Burton Act, which, among other measures, contained a trade embargo against Cuba. The 
purpose of the embargo was to pressure Cuba to become democratic and renounce 
communism.
10
 In addition to preventing U.S. corporations from trading with Cuban 
                                                
4
 Ruggie (2008)  
5
 Ruggie (2008) at 4-5 
6
 Ruggie (2008) at 9 
7
 Whitepaper (2009) 
8
 ibid at 6 
9
 ibid at 7-10 
10
 Hillyard (1998) at 22-23 
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businesses, the act also prohibited the use of third party suppliers, contractors or other 
business partners that were engaged in trade relations with Cuba.
11
 This extraterritorial 
effect was not well received by some of the U.S.’ largest trading partner states. The EU and 
Canada adopted blocking-legislation prohibiting corporations from openly complying with 
the act,
12
 and Canada also joined Mexico in declaring that the act was in violation of 
international law and the U.S.’ NAFTA obligations.
13
 Indeed, the UN General Assembly 
directed the Inter-American Juridical Committee of the Organization of American States to 
examine the act and settle the controversies.
14
 The Committee concluded that the act 
violated international law, because the U.S. had failed to recognize the various limitations 
on its jurisdiction.
15
 In the end, the U.S. had to accept that corporations from other states 
continued to do business with both Cuba and the U.S., while keeping the act in a more 
limited capacity as a domestic regulation only controlling U.S. legal subjects.  
 
The Helms-Burton Act caused controversies and protests based mainly on arguments 
concerning jurisdiction and trade obligations.
16
 Regulations imposed by a home state 
requiring a specific level of corporate human rights compliance throughout the chain of 
production, regardless of location, may have extra-territorial effects similar to the Helms-
Burton act, and may face similar objections. However, all states share some obligations to 
respect and protect the universal human rights, providing a compelling interest for allowing 
extraterritorial regulation, despite possible violations of jurisdiction and other international 
obligations.  
 
This thesis considers the situation of a home state that wishes to enact laws to regulate the 
                                                
11
 Hoffman (1998) at 11 
12
 Hoffman(1998) at 12-13, Seck (2008) at 10 
13
 Rubin (1996) at 2 
14
 l.c. 
15
 ibid at 2-3 
16
 Rubin (1996) at 1 
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human rights performance of a domestic corporation throughout the supply chain, 
including in contractors and subcontractors and other business partners abroad. This thesis 
will examine the legitimacy of such regulation and address how human rights regulation 
would affect the relationship between the home and the host states. In particular, the thesis 
examines whether regulations enacted by the home state would impinge on the host state’s 
sovereignty, whether it is a violation of the duty to cooperate, and whether the measure is 
trade restrictive in breach of the home state’s obligations under the WTO. 
 
1.2 Structure  
The thesis is divided into five chapters. The purpose of the first two chapters is to present 
the topic and establish the framework. In the first chapter, the topic, the scope, the 
terminology and the structure are announced. The second chapter presents the measures 
that a home state may reasonably want to implement to pursue its intended goal and how 
these can be monitored and enforced. 
 
The next two chapters are the main sections of the thesis, where I will discuss the possible 
obstacles pursuant to the extraterritorial effects of the home state’s human rights 
requirement. The third chapter deals with the objection based on state sovereignty: what the 
domestic measure in the home state means for the sovereignty of the host state, and 
whether the home state breaches the duty to cooperate when unilaterally enacting a piece of 
regulation that will have international effects. The fourth chapter looks at the measure in a 
trade specific context, and evaluates it in terms of the home and the host states’ obligations 
and rights under the WTO, according to the GATT and the TBT Agreement. The fifth and 
final chapter contains the conclusions. 
 5 
 
1.3 Terminology 
1.3.1 Overview 
 
 
 
 
Home state         Host state 
      |                 | 
    Domestic corporation ---------contract---------- Contractor/ Supplier/ 
    Subcontractor   
 
Illustration 1.3.1.1  
 
The above illustration summarizes the terms used in this thesis for relationships between 
states and corporations. In short, the home state wants to enact a regulation requiring its 
domestic corporation to adhere to specific human rights measures throughout its chain of 
production, including its foreign contractors, subcontractors and suppliers. The host state 
may object to the regulation due to the effect it has in the host state, which can be argued to 
be contrary to customary law or treaty law that governs the relations between the two 
states. 
 
The home state refers to the state that wants to enact a domestic regulation requiring its 
corporations to maintain a certain level of human rights throughout their supply chains. The 
analysis assumes that the home state respects and protects human rights within its own 
jurisdiction, and wants to promote them abroad as well, starting by improving the 
performance of domestic corporations and their contractors. 
 
Interstate relations 
 6 
The host state(s) refers to the individual state(s) with territorial jurisdiction over the 
contractors, suppliers and subcontractors that are part of the domestic corporation’s chain 
of production. The host states may claim to be adversely affected by the regulations 
enacted by the home state. 
 
The domestic corporation/ the corporation is the main corporation with a supply chain 
abroad, and the subject to the regulation enacted by the home state. The corporation could 
be any type of business enterprise; private or public, incorporated or personal.  
 
The contractor, supplier, or subcontractors are the businesses included in the domestic 
corporation’s chain of production. Unlike the main corporation, these enterprises are not 
the home state’s subjects, but they are under the jurisdiction of a host state.  
 
The discussion in this thesis considers what the home state could do to promote human 
rights in relation to separate entities that manufacture or export products, exclusively or 
not, to the domestic corporation. Subsidiaries of the domestic corporation have been 
excluded, as regulation of MNEs relies on other legal justifications. In those cases, the 
home state is also much freer to enact human rights requirements directly on them.
17
 
 
1.3.2 Human Rights Treaties 
In accordance with the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR), all human rights 
are understood as interdependent and of equal importance.
18
 The human rights basis for a 
domestic measure regulating subcontractors and suppliers could be found in international 
or regional treaties, bilateral agreements or domestic law, and this section will analyze the 
different potential bases for regulating foreign contractors.  
 
                                                
17
 Skogly(2002), Ratner (2001), Vasquez (2005), Addo (1999) 
18
 UDHR Art. 28 and 30 
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As the purpose of the measure is to improve human rights protection, it seems safe to 
assume that the home state would use the strongest and most stable human rights regime. 
Human rights treaties contain more clearly defined rights than customary law or 
peremptory norms, and whenever reasonable and possible, the home state is likely to base 
its measures on the most basic and widespread human rights regime.  
 
International human rights conventions have an advantage in this respect, as the rights 
included are common for almost all states, and the treaties have been ratified by most.
19
 
These treaties are agreements between states, and impose obligations on them to respect 
and protect the rights of the people.
20
 The conventions are common expressions of human 
rights norms, and the conventions employ comparable definitions and terminology. The 
International Bill of Rights [UDHR, ICCPR
21
, ICESCR
22
], the CAT
23
, CRC
24
 and 
CEDAW
25
 are often used by human rights advocates and states when debating how to 
ensure and improve human rights protection. These conventions have a lot of practice and 
supporting arguments surrounding them, such as general comments and committee 
statements, and many of the basic human rights have also become customary international 
law.
26
  
 
                                                
19
 Understanding The WTO: The Organization Members and Observers (2008), Office of 
the UNHCHR (2004) 
20
 ICCPR Preamble and Art. 2.1, ICESCR Preamble and Art. 2.1 
21
 International Convention on Civil and Political Rights (1966) 
22
 International Convention on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (1966) 
23
 Convention Against Torture (1984) 
24
 Convention for the Rights of the Child (1989) 
25
 Convention for the Elimination of Discrimination Against Women (1979) 
26
 Nicaragua v. US paras. 268-269 
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It would also be possible to use regional or bilateral human rights agreements as bases for 
the measure. Regional human rights agreements, such as the ECHR
27
, are often less 
ambiguous than international treaties, as the state parties share one understanding of the 
treaty text. By basing its human rights measure on a regional agreement, the home state 
would be referring to a pervasive, yet stable, understanding of the rights, especially if the 
host state also is a party to the treaty.  
 
The domestic human rights legislation implemented in a home state is presumably rather 
effective in promoting the respect and protection of its nationals’ human rights. This 
assumption follows from the concern and interest the home state takes in promoting human 
rights in a wider context. A home state might consider its own regulation of human rights 
to be the best base for the human rights measure enacted on corporate chains of production. 
The domestic corporations’ contractors abroad are presumably not bound by equally 
stringent demands, so by enacting this regulation the home state could promote human 
rights and improve the standards abroad through the corporate contracts.  
 
Where international treaties suffer from vagueness and ambiguity, regional or domestic 
human rights regulations show perhaps too little appreciation for alternative interpretations 
based on cultural and social differences when applied outside the intended region. Even 
regional and domestic regulations might be ambiguous and unclear, and as the international 
norms are more established, they might provide the best basis for the domestic measure for 
human rights protection throughout the supply chain. 
 
1.4 Scope of the Thesis 
This thesis examines the question: Can a home state enact domestic measures regulating its 
corporations’ use of suppliers and subcontractors in other states based on human rights 
concerns without breaching any of its international obligations and without encroaching on 
the rights of other states? Although the requirements imposed on domestic corporations by 
                                                
27
 European Convention on Human Rights (1950) 
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the home state are internal regulations, they will inevitably affect the corporations’ various 
contracts and contracting partners abroad. The suppliers and subcontractors might find that 
the regulations are difficult to implement, and that they cause comparative disadvantages 
due to the costs associated with efficiently protecting and respecting human rights laws.  
 
As treaties and customary law are the principal sources of international law,
28
 the following 
discussion will be structured around them. The human rights concerns will be addressed by 
looking on international human rights treaties, in particular the International Bill of Rights, 
as these are the most common and widely accepted agreements in the field. Customary 
human rights law has a special standing, in particular as jus cogens and erga omnes norms, 
and will therefore also be included.  
 
The basic principles of customary law and the UN Charter will be the main basis for the 
discussion of the effects on state sovereignty. Furthermore, the discussion concerning the 
trade restrictiveness of the home state’s human rights regulation will be limited to issues 
under the WTO Agreements, as the WTO is the most common and extensive trade 
agreement. For the purposes of this thesis, only the relevant agreements concerning trade in 
goods, the GATT
29
 and the TBT
30
, have been considered. The main focus here is on the 
chain of production and general trade in goods, with the possibility of limiting trade due to 
human rights concerns. Therefore other WTO agreements, such as the GATS
31
 and the 
SPS
32
, which deal with other issues, have been excluded from the argument.  
 
                                                
28
 Vienna Convention Art. 38 
29
 General Agreement on Trade and Tariffs (1994) 
30
 Agreement on Technical Barriers to Trade (1994) 
31
 General Agreement on Trade in Services (1994) 
32
 Agreement on the Application of Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures (1994) 
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The ILO Declarations
33
 have also been omitted from further discussion in this thesis. They 
are highly specialized on labor rights and standards, and promote them through co-
operation between states, corporations and workers. These agreements are far less common 
and universal than the UN human rights treaties, and while many states have ratified them, 
the argument would require overly detailed arguments and become too state specific for the 
purposes of the discussion here.  
 
Investment treaties and bilateral treaties have not been implemented into my argument, as 
that would require a more state specific discussion, while also widening the focus of the 
thesis to include more areas. Such expansion would jeopardize the in-depth discussion of 
the individual issues presented in this thesis. 
 
                                                
33
 ILO Declaration on Fundamental Principles and Rights at Work (1998) and the Tripartite 
Declaration of Principles Concerning Multilateral Enterprises and Social Policy (2000) 
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2 Measures 
2.1 Introduction 
When the home state of a corporation with subcontractors and suppliers abroad wants to 
promote human rights, its most direct option is to implement legislation to ensure effective 
corporate human rights responsibility throughout the chain of production. The main 
alternatives to date have been voluntary initiatives and so-called soft-law options. Many 
argue that such initiatives are insufficient to ensure that corporations conduct their business 
in a socially responsible manner and have to be supported by hard law.
34
  
 
All sovereign states have the right to enact legislation within their own jurisdiction over 
their own subjects.
35
 A home state can always encourage its domestic corporations to 
promote human rights by making conscious and ethical choices and by asking their foreign 
business relations to do the same.
 36
 Additionally, unless the internal or domestic legislation 
constitutes a restriction on the home state’s other international obligations or on the 
exclusive rights of other states, it may freely implement measures with various policy 
objectives, such as measures promoting corporate compliance with human rights laws.
37
  
 
This chapter will look at which measures a home state can implement that will be practical 
and effective in promoting human rights throughout the domestic corporations’ supply 
chains abroad. An important consideration is that there are practical and economic 
                                                
34
 Vasquez (2005), Ruggie (2008), Ratner (2001) et al. 
35
 Brownlie (2008) at 289 
36
 Whitepaper (2009) at 10-12 
37
 infra sections 3 and 4 
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limitations to what a corporation reasonably can affect through its international contracts.
38
 
Extensive regulations may be too complicated to implement for corporations, particularly if 
the business partners and host states object to the demands. In the following sub-sections, 
practicable measures will be examined and discussed. 
 
2.2 Regulations Requiring Human Rights Compliance 
In order to affect the respect of human rights throughout the corporations’ supply chains, a 
home state will want to implement measures that effectively promote the aim, while being 
reasonable and practical to handle for corporations. Certain measures would be easily 
feasible for a corporation to impose on its contractors and suppliers, such as production 
standards and business practices to achieve good corporate conduct and viable human 
rights protection.  
 
International initiatives, such as the OECD Guidelines for MNEs
39
 and the UN Global 
Compact
40
, propose certain principles that corporations with subsidiaries in other states 
should abide by. They both reference the UN Human Rights treaties and the ILO 
Declarations
41
, and the human rights-related provisions encourage corporations to assume 
responsibility for their effective implementation. The preamble to the UDHR requires that 
“[e]very individual and every organ of society” shall  promote respect for these rights and 
secure them.
42
 No one is exempted from the obligations this declaration assigns to all 
members of the global community.
43
 These measures could be expanded to the 
subcontractors and suppliers of corporations as well, but consideration should be given to 
the fact that corporations have less control over supply chains than over subsidiaries.  
                                                
38
 Whitepaper (2009) at 36-43 
39
 OECD Guidelines for Multi National Enterprises 
40
 UN Global Compact 
41
 ILO Declarations 
42
 UDHR Preamble 
43
 Henkin (1999) at 25 
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2.2.1 Procedural Measures 
A home state may want to promote human rights compliance throughout the corporate 
chain of production despite not having direct influence over the corporations’ foreign 
suppliers and subcontractors. However, the home state could implement procedural 
measures that focus on the practices surrounding the level of human rights protection in the 
domestic corporation. The home state could also demand that the corporations abide by 
specific procedural regulations to address and solve the issues related to the human rights 
requirements within their sphere of influence.
44
 
 
One possible procedural measure could be to require the corporations to provide an 
independent body for grievances, to which the workers and other affected people could 
turn, such as an ombudsman or a corporate human rights committee. An arbitration system 
for solving human rights related conflicts could address problems at the workplace or in the 
surrounding society and environment. The implementation of such systems would give the 
individuals whose human rights have been violated procedural rights directly against the 
domestic corporation, and not merely against the host state. 
 
Procedural regulations could also focus on the practices of the corporation and its 
contractors and suppliers, and demand active monitoring and reporting of the human rights 
levels, or a more passive information requirement, for instance that the corporation has 
access to information which can be reported on upon request from the home state.
45
 
Extensive monitoring of existing business partners where concerns have arisen and 
thorough evaluation of prospective business relations could also be relevant alternatives.  
 
                                                
44
 UN Global Compact 
45
 Environmental Information Act art. 16 , Aarhus convention art. 5 
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2.2.2 Substantive Measures 
Another mechanism to regulate the corporations’ human rights performance abroad could 
be to enact substantive requirements requiring the contracting parties to comply with 
specific human rights norms. The corporation in the home state has to abide by the 
regulation the home state enacts, which could include having to ensure that the human 
rights requirements are met throughout its chain of production in domestic and 
international contracts.  
 
Corporations and contractors are often criticized for various human rights violations, often 
related to working conditions and labor rights, but also for being complicit in violations 
committed by state actors. Indirect complicity is harder to control and easier to justify for 
the corporate actors, and is therefore considered to be different from direct violations.
46
 To 
combat both types of violations, substantive requirements can be linked either to the host 
state’s policy and treaty adoption or to the labor conditions at the suppliers’ and 
subcontractors’ factories. Regulations demanding corporate human rights compliance could 
prevent corporations from conducting business in or outsourcing to companies in states that 
do not live up to specific human rights norms.  
 
International human rights treaties are contracts between states on a horizontal and global 
level, yet the obligations to respect, protect and fulfill human rights are vertical in relation 
to their subjects.
47
 Human rights treaties often extend the responsibility to respect and 
protect human rights to the individual subjects, directly encouraging private initiatives in 
addition to the state’s obligation.
48
 Additionally, states have human rights obligations 
according to customary law.
49
 In order to fulfill the duties prescribed by both treaty and 
customary law, states have to ensure compliance with the human rights norms, for instance 
                                                
46
 Trebilcock (2001) at 12 
47
 Ratner (2001) at 470-472 
48
 ICCPR Preamble, ICESCR Preamble  
49
 infra section 1.3.2 
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by enacting legislation and implementing certain standards to ensure that their subjects 
respect each other’s rights.
50
  
 
Some human rights obligations are easily applied horizontally between private actors, 
especially when it comes to respecting the rights. Giving human rights obligations 
horizontal effect entails directly giving the individual subjects responsibilities to respect, 
protect and fulfill the rights of others to the greatest extent possible.  Horizontal duties can 
be found through interpretation of the human rights norms and treaties or they can be 
implemented by the states as domestic regulations.
51
 Although states may be the best 
entities for ensuring the protection and respect for some human rights, such as habeas 
corpus
52
 and freedom of expression
53
, that does not mean that corporations or other actors 
cannot contribute. However, when discussing corporate human rights responsibilities, the 
focus is often on human rights that can be directly influenced by the actions of the 
corporations.  
 
The substantive measures should accommodate the corporate sphere of influence, focusing 
on labor rights, which are the easiest to ensure and implement, as they are directly relevant 
to the business, where corporations generally have more clout than in their relations with 
the host states. The requirements imposed by the home state would be the most efficient if 
they focused on the typical corporate human rights violations – such as child labor, poor 
work conditions, banning unions, limiting freedom of speech and restricting freedom of 
movement. 54 
                                                
50
 General comment 31  
51
 Vasquez (2005) 
52
 ICCPR art. 9 
53
 ICCPR art. 19 
54
 Ruggie (2008) at 15-16 
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2.3 Ensuring Compliance 
In order to efficiently ensure compliance with the human rights measures, the home state 
has to enforce them and sanction violations. Domestically, a sovereign state has full 
jurisdiction to implement a sanctioning mechanism for internal measures, but it cannot 
enforce the measures’ extraterritorial effects.  Naturally, the subcontractors and suppliers 
will be affected if the domestic corporation is subject to sanctions by the home state. Such 
effects appear indirect and incidental, but can give the contractors incentive to cooperate 
with the domestic corporation to ensure that the measures are fulfilled to avoid any 
negative repercussions. That part of the implementation will be between the domestic 
corporation and its contractors abroad as according to their contract. 
 
The state may hold the domestic corporations accountable for breaching the regulations, 
using either financial penalties or other criminal sanctions, such as incarceration or 
debarment of rights. Monetary sanctions are more commonly used for corporate crimes, as 
these can be imposed easily and justly on legal persons. Possible financial sanctions can 
range from simple fines or extra taxes to blacklisting the corporation and freezing its funds.  
 
Blacklisting would involve denying the corporations that fail to implement the 
requirements access to the markets in the home state.
55
 While trade embargos are often 
used by states and organizations to express discontent or conflicting interests concerning 
politics or other practices, only the domestic corporation could be blacklisted as the 
subcontractors and suppliers are outside the home state’s jurisdiction and not bound by the 
regulation. However, the human rights performance of the contractors is what determines 
whether the domestic corporation meets the required standards throughout the chain of 
production. The Helms-Burton Act
56
 similarly prevented U.S. nationals and its contractors 
and trade partners from doing business with Cuba, with the threat of blacklisting any 
                                                
55
 Hillyard (1998) at 16 
56
 Helms-Burton Act (1996) 
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corporation that violated this act,
57
 thus indirectly blacklisting subcontractors not meeting 
the requirement. 
 
Another provision, similar to blacklisting, could be applied to enforce the compliance with 
the human rights requirement directly on a contractor: if a domestic corporation is 
employing a contractor abroad, and it has a branch or a subsidiary located in the home 
state’s jurisdiction, the contractor could be held responsible for its human rights violations 
in the host state under the domestic legislation in the home state. Based on information 
regarding the contractor, the home state could freeze the funds of the branch under its 
jurisdiction, or it could blacklist anyone who deals with that particular contractor. This, 
however, requires an effective monitoring system or mechanism.  
 
2.4 Monitoring Compliance  
Before any steps can be taken against domestic corporations that fail to adhere to the 
regulation, their non-fulfillment must be demonstrated. The home state cannot sanction 
violations of the human rights requirement without proof. According to the principle of the 
burden of proof, as well as the findings of several international tribunals, such as the AB 
and the ICJ, the burden of proof rests upon whoever asserts the affirmative of a particular 
claim.
58
 This implies that the home state will have the burden of proof regarding a 
corporation’s failure to maintain the required level of human rights compliance throughout 
its chain of production. 
 
If the home state enacts a procedural requirement that demands that the corporation gathers 
information about the human rights levels or even submits reports, it becomes fairly easy to 
demonstrate the lack of adherence. If the corporation fails to meet the procedural 
requirement, it is already in violation of the measure and this is easily discovered due to the 
                                                
57
 Hoffman (1998) at 11 
58
 e.g. US – Wool Shirts and Blouses (AB) pp. 15–16 
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missing information. For substantive measures, a more developed monitoring and 
enforcement system is required, and both the home state and the corporations would have 
to invest time and money to implement trustworthy and solid methods. The corporation 
would also have less bargaining power when negotiating the terms of the contracts, as it 
has to ensure that human rights compliance is included, a term which the contractor might 
not appreciate. As it is beyond the home state’s reach to monitor and check up on the 
reports issued by the corporations, it could be tempting for many to save time and money 
and falsify the monitoring and issue fake reports. However, the home state is also able to 
obtain information from other sources such as various NGOs and intergovernmental 
organizations. 
 
In regions where treaty bodies and international organizations already have mechanisms for 
complaints and monitoring in place, these can be used to monitor human rights standards 
and report on them too. If the home state has embassies and consulates in the host states, 
those can also be used
59
, but only to monitor the home state’s legal subjects. As the interest 
in human rights friendly merchandise has increased, certification organizations have 
become common and fairly useful, and such organizations could also provide the needed 
insight to determine whether corporations adhere to the human rights regulations. 
 
While enacting human rights measures for corporations may improve human rights 
compliance throughout the supply chain, the additional obligations for corporate actors and 
the expenses involved could cause them to flag out. By relocating their business and 
registering in another state where the human rights regulation is more lenient, they would 
not be under the same requirements and regulations, enabling them to cut costs and to 
continue using their subcontractors regardless of the human rights performance. However, 
this approach would still prevent the corporation from doing business in the home state, as 
the measures are applicable to all corporate actors in the home state: suppliers and other 
business partners as well. 
                                                
59
 Whitepaper (2009) at 85-88 
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3 Sovereignty  
3.1 Introduction to section 
A nationally enacted measure requiring human rights compliance and protection by 
corporate actors will have consequences beyond the home state’s national borders and 
territorial jurisdiction. Domestic corporations are involved with contractors and other 
enterprises abroad: corporate entities that are considered part of the domestic corporation’s 
supply chain, and that will be affected by the human rights requirements. 
 
Such development could be of grave concern to not only the contractors and suppliers, but 
to the host state itself. The effects the home state’s regulation has in the host state may be 
conceived as intrusive and disrespectful of the host state’s sovereign rights. Using 
economic measures to influence foreign governments’ politics can be a questionable 
practice.
60
 Procedural measures could encroach on confidential and privileged information, 
causing worries of espionage and infiltration. Substantive regulations might be perceived as 
directly challenging and impinging on the host state’s sovereignty as it undertakes to 
control the nationals of the host state, as well as the host state’s implementation of and 
adherence to various international human rights obligations.  
 
This chapter will examine how these procedural and substantive human rights measures 
might affect the sovereignty of a host state. In the first section, it will be discussed whether 
the measure impinges on the exclusive territorial jurisdiction, and in the second, whether 
the measure is a violation of the duty to cooperate. 
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3.2 Human Rights Regulation and the Exclusive Territorial Jurisdiction 
3.2.1 Exclusive Territorial Jurisdiction 
Public international law is based on the fundamental legal principles of state sovereignty 
and the equality of sovereign states. These principles have evolved in customary 
international law, and have later also been codified in international treaty law.
61
 State 
sovereignty consists of certain elements; the power each state has in terms of jurisdiction 
over its territory and subjects; the right of non-intervention by other states; and the ability 
to be bound to customary international law and to consent to being bound by treaties.
62
  
 
The territorial jurisdiction of a sovereign state is exclusive; other sovereign states cannot 
exercise their own sovereign powers on its territory. From the principle of exclusive 
territorial jurisdiction, it follows that all sovereign states have the power to enact legislation 
and to impose performance requirements on their subjects, including corporations, within 
their own jurisdiction. Deliberately attempting to legislate on the host state’s territory and 
under its jurisdiction would clearly be different from implementing a domestic measure 
that might have international repercussions.
63
 Human rights regulations enacted in relation 
to domestic corporations and their supply chains may have consequences for the 
contractors in the host state, but the human rights argument represents a valid objective for 
the regulation. The fact that the host state too has an obligation to protect the same rights, 
may make it difficult for it to make a solid argument against the measure. 
 
The states referred to are assumed to be functioning states that maintain the needs of their 
citizens and that are in control of their jurisdiction or at least persuasively claim to be. 
Failed states however are unable to sufficiently exercise control over their territory and care 
for their nationals, imposing a duty on other states to collectively assist and help protect the 
people of the failed state, giving other states a right and an obligation to provide assistance 
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to the failed state and the citizens under its jurisdiction.
64
 This particularly concerns 
ensuring that their human rights are being respected and protected.
65
  
 
When dealing with other functioning states, however, the home state has to respect the 
exclusive territorial jurisdiction of the host states. Consequently, as the domestic human 
rights regulations enacted by the home state impact legal areas under the exclusive 
jurisdiction of the host state, it could be claimed that the regulations represent an 
impingement on the host state’s sovereignty. The measure may be directly opposing 
legislation or directives enacted by the host state; a substantive measure requiring better 
human rights conditions in factories could be incompatible with regulations in the host state 
allowing human rights violations in so called sweatshops and “export zones” in order to 
promote economic development.
66
 Procedural measures demanding information on 
conditions could interfere with confidentiality and non-disclosure provisions in the host 
state.  
 
3.2.2 Procedural Requirements  
The host state could argue that the procedural requirements the home state enacts represent 
an impingement of its sovereignty due to the imposition on the exclusive territorial 
jurisdiction. The domestic corporation is required to implement procedures for information 
gathering and reporting throughout the supply chain, and the measure could also demand 
that a complaints mechanism is established to allow workers to complain if they believe 
that their rights are violated.
67
  
 
Procedural measures demanding recourse for workers and other affected persons with 
human rights grievances could be directly interfering with the exclusive jurisdiction of the 
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host state, as it has the executive, legislative and judicial powers on its territory.
68
 
Regulations from the home state on the domestic corporation to ensure that disputes are 
solved in an independent organ might easily be interpreted as a failure to recognize the 
powers of the host state.  
 
The principle of exclusive territorial jurisdiction makes it clear that only the host state can 
implement regulations on its own territory in relation to its subjects. When the home state 
enacts legislation with procedural requirements on the domestic corporation, the host state 
could see the information demands as intrusive, especially if they conflict with existing 
regulations, such as legislation concerning confidential information. Even though the 
human rights measure is only directed at the domestic corporation, the effects it has on the 
contractors and suppliers in the host state are intentional.  
 
However, a lot of information regarding the human rights adherence is freely available 
from NGOs, certification organizations and intergovernmental organizations, such as the 
UN and the WTO. Inquiries could also be made directly of the host state and the 
contractors concerning their human rights level, yet they are not obligated to provide the 
information sought. If the home state or the domestic corporation makes use of these 
voluntary and freely available sources to gather information, their actions cannot be 
claimed to violate the sovereign rights of the host state.  
 
Which information is restricted and which is freely available to the public will vary from 
state to state. Home states and domestic corporations seeking facts have to abide by the 
regulations in the host state, as it has the legislative power within its jurisdiction. If the host 
state restricts access to corporate information about state policies or on corporate affairs, 
including on human rights and labor conditions, the domestic corporation will not be able 
to fulfill the requirement imposed by the home state. The measure would thereby cause the 
domestic corporation to end its engagement with the subcontractors and suppliers in the 
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host state so as not to be in violation of the regulation. Attempts made by the home state to 
overrule the legislation in the host state by implementing its own will be void, as it is 
outside the jurisdiction of the home state, and such efforts could be perceived as impinging 
on the host state’s sovereign right to exclusive territorial jurisdiction. 
 
3.2.3 Substantive Requirements 
Regulations that require specific material measures for human rights protection throughout 
the corporate chain of production can seem very intrusive in relation to the host state. The 
home state may demand that domestic corporations only employ the services of contractors 
and suppliers that respect and protect human rights; and only do business in host states that 
have adopted international human rights treaties and that seek to fulfill their duties under 
these treaties.
69
  
 
Substantive measures may impinge on the exclusive territorial jurisdiction of the host state 
because the home state attempts to exercise its powers on the sovereign jurisdiction of the 
host state. If the host state has implemented the human rights treaties and ensures that 
human rights are respected and protected, the effect of the measure is of little consequence. 
On the other hand, if the host state is uninterested and unwilling to implementing human 
rights treaties and norms, the home state’s regulation could be directly contrary to the host 
state’s, thereby imposing on its jurisdiction. 
 
The home state could argue that the substantive measure it wishes to impose is based on 
universal human rights. Human rights are considered to be basic and inherent universal and 
interdependent rights and freedoms to which all human beings are entitled.
70
 All states have 
adopted the UDHR, in addition to at least one other human rights treaty, meaning that the 
host state too has accepted their existence. Treaties typically restrict the sovereign power of 
the state parties, by giving them obligations in relation to each other and to their subjects. A 
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treaty only binds the states that have agreed to it,
71
 whereas customary law is binding on all 
states.
72
 The home state could argue that based on the interdependency of the rights, the 
host state has to accept the existence of the other rights as well. 
 
3.2.4 Human Rights Rationale 
The general obligation on states to respect and promote human rights within their territory 
and jurisdiction is one of interest to all states.
73
 It is often interpreted to be an obligation of 
domestic value and interest only, due to the principle of state sovereignty.74 However, 
human rights duties and responsibilities cannot be sufficiently covered if restricted by 
territorial limits – especially when legal actors have a much wider sphere of influence due 
to international trade and globalization.
75
 
 
In order to establish the rules in any given area, all sources of international law treaties and 
agreements, custom, general principles and judicial decisions, must be examined and 
balanced against each other.
76
 While human rights law to some extent does limit the 
sovereign power of states, it does not directly contradict the rights and obligations states 
have as sovereign.
77
 Customary international law also reaches beyond the states’ sovereign 
protection, as their ability to be bound by customary law is one of the elements of their 
sovereign power.
78
 Several basic human rights have become part of customary international 
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law, while remaining in the treaties too.
79
 Amongst these are the right to be free from 
slavery, the right not to be tortured, the right not to be discriminated against, habeas 
corpus, the freedom from forced labor, et al.
80
 The home state could argue that the host 
state is bound by these norms despite not ratifying the treaties, and that it must accept the 
substantive measures based on the universal human rights in customary law.  
 
Despite the argument that human rights are universal and part of customary law, the host 
state can claim not to be bound by them under the principle of persistent objector.
81
 The 
states that claim to not be bound by customary law must have categorically refused to see 
eye to eye with the international community regarding the existence of a specific rule. This 
doctrine nullifies the standing of human rights as customary international law in relation to 
the persistent objector state – although other states are still bound by the norm – which 
could make the argument above useless in relation to a host state.
82
 
 
The host state may see human rights norms as an obstacle to other aims that it finds more 
pressing and important. It is not uncommon in developing countries to have so-called 
sweatshops and export zones, where people come to do nothing but work and hopefully 
save up some money.  The conditions in these zones typically violate basic human rights, 
but it could be considered a better alternative for the workers than scavenging or going into 
prostitution to survive.
83
 A human rights requirement could end the profitability for the 
corporation in the export zones, and the workers could end up in even worse conditions. 
Similarly, the host state may implement security measures that restrict human rights of 
certain groups, such as the freedom of speech, freedom of movement, right to vote, 
freedom of religion and association, justified as protection against violent liberation 
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movements or terrorist groups. These types of objections to the home state’s domestic 
requirements of human rights are typically presented as valid objections in the name of 
protecting other state interests, such as economic development and security. 
 
However, the universality and inseparability of human rights can be argued to make such 
arguments void and also incompatible with the principle of persistent objector.
 84
 Working 
in export zones is not inherently bad, but human rights should be respected and promoted 
according to the same standards regardless of the background of the individual person. The 
values protected by human rights may affect the absolute character of the doctrine, as it 
could be argued that the basic human rights are more important than the sovereign ability 
of states to choose whether or not to be bound by certain principles of customary law. 
 
While both states are bound by the human rights rules, whether by treaty or custom, that 
does not necessarily mean that one state can enforce the obligations on the others. 
Obligations erga omnes are duties of one state towards the international community as a 
whole, because their existence is of interest to all.
 85
 In a dictum by the ICJ in Barcelona 
Traction “the principles and rules concerning the basic rights of the human person” were 
found to be among the obligations erga omnes in international law.
86
 Accordingly, these 
duties give the state parties legal procedural rights in relation to each other, enabling them 
to enforce the compliance with the obligations.
87
 
 
There is no hierarchy of legal sources in public international law, with the exception of the 
UN Charter and jus cogens, which are peremptory norms. However, while several human 
rights have become customary international law, very few have achieved the status of jus 
                                                
84
 Holning (2005)  
85
 Belgium v. Spain paras. 33 - 34 
86
 Belgium v. Spain para. 34 
87
 DASR art. 48 
 27 
cogens.
88
 The persistent objector doctrine does not apply for jus cogens norms. Their status 
as peremptory indicates that all states have to respect and protect them, and that they will 
override any other international or domestic laws that could interfere with the purpose of 
the jus cogens human rights.  
 
As all states have these obligations, a domestic regulation regarding human rights 
protection in accordance with the jus cogens norms could be assumed to be compatible 
with the host state’s legislation and practice. Similarly, would one expect that regulations 
enacted in line with a human rights treaty or customary law to be in harmony with other 
state parties’ legislation and practices, as they are bound by the same international 
obligations. A doctrine similar to the margin of appreciation applied by the European 
Court of Human Rights could also be taken into consideration, as the states may interpret 
the same human rights differently depending on their traditions and existing systems, 
causing dissonance between the enactments. However, the core meaning of the rights can 
be determined more easily, based on the phrasing of the articles and the treaties, the 
travaux preparatoires, general comments and case law.
89
 
 
The various state parties to the human rights agreements, both the host and the home state, 
have obligations towards each other to adhere to the articles in the covenant in relation to 
the individuals subject to their jurisdictions. The rules in the agreements neither require nor 
prohibit the states from regulating human rights protection in corporate relations abroad
90
 – 
in fact, by interpreting the treaties one may find that the host state might be bound by the 
treaty to permit such cross-border regulation when it benefits the level of human rights 
promotion.
91
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The horizontal effects that human rights are often given, relate first and foremost to the 
human rights obligations between individuals.
92
 However, as established above, the human 
rights treaties are between states and the obligations are therefore also between them. A 
number of academics subscribe to the use of a general national treatment principle in such 
cases.
93
 According to this principle, measures that are non-discriminatory and related to the 
efficient functioning of the state should be regarded as acceptable. Domestic human rights 
legislation throughout the chain of production with effects in the host states would 
presumably be considered justifiable, due to the importance and the universality of the 
rights.  
 
3.3 Duty to Cooperate 
3.3.1 Sovereign States and the Duty to Cooperate 
The duty to cooperate is at the very core of public international law, as a basic principle of 
customary law to achieve peaceful coexistence.
94
 In the UN Charter it became a regulation 
symbolic of the states’ cooperation and mutual respect,
95
 and it has been reiterated and 
strengthened in the Declaration on Principles of International Law Concerning Friendly 
Relations and Co-operation Among States in Accordance with the Charter of the United 
Nations , also known as the Friendly Relations Declaration [FRD]
96
. The obligation urges 
states to work together to solve problems, to prevent disagreements and to promote human 
rights. 
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The human rights measure implemented by the home state, while domestic, concerns an 
area of interest to the international community. In domestic matters, states make 
independent internal decisions all the time and it is their prerogative as sovereign states to 
do so. If states unilaterally make decisions that will affect everyone, they do not only risk 
conflicts, but they also disregard the other sovereign states by not including them in the 
decision of international and multilateral consequence. The host state could therefore argue 
that the home state is in violation of the duty to cooperate.  Sovereign states are equal and 
should respect each other 
97
, and in doing so they should bear in mind their common right 
to exclusive territorial jurisdiction, and also to non-intervention and the ability to be bound 
by treaties.
98
   
 
On the other hand, multilateralism and international agreements require a much more 
extensive and drawn-out process than a national regulation. While the benefit of following 
the procedure for international agreements is that the states will have reached a consensus 
on how to manage the problem; the disadvantage is that the solution will be based on 
compromises and vague terminology, and reaching an agreement will require ample time 
and resources.  
 
State sovereignty and the duty to cooperate could be treated as completely separate 
arguments as they are based on separate principles, yet due to the strong linkages between 
them, such distinction would seem artificial for the purposes here. States only have a duty 
to cooperate with other sovereign states.
99
 The host state could argue that the home state is 
disregarding its sovereignty by refraining from deliberating the measure with it before 
implementing it. On the other hand, if they refrain from cooperation, and instead single-
handedly implement regulations that will affect other states as well, this may be perceived 
as disrespectful and intrusive by the other states in question. 
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3.3.2 The Duty to Cooperate on Human Rights  
In relation to human rights, the duty to cooperate may have an even stronger foundation 
than usually. The obligation to cooperate does not merely require compliance from the 
various individual actors, but it demands that everyone, states and persons alike, strive to 
promote and secure these rights by implementing progressive measures both domestically 
and internationally. According to the FRD the measure as enacted by the home state to 
promote human rights throughout the supply chain regulation in the spirit of the UDHR.
100
  
Although human rights requirements are enacted according to the purpose of these 
declarations, the manner in which it is sought implemented by the home state can arguably 
be challenged under the same declarations. 
 
According to the UDHR, the FRD and customary law, states are obligated to cooperate 
with one another. The customary principle is more general than the others, and it aims to 
prevent states from hindering contracts and other mutually beneficial relations.
101
 The FRD 
mostly focuses on cooperation concerning peaceful and neighborly relations, as well as 
respect for human rights and freedoms.
102
  Naturally, the customary principle and the 
declarations also take the principles of sovereign equality and non-intervention into 
consideration.
103
 These principles are all fundamental and important for the co-existence of 
states and peoples, and they are complimentary. However, in some cases, such principles 
collide, as one may cut into the other: the sovereignty of the host state may be affected by 
the home state’s desire to promote human rights in the supply chains of its corporate actors. 
 
Although the FRD chiefly advocates cooperation, unilateral action in order to promote 
“respect for and observance of human rights and fundamental freedoms in accordance with 
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the Charter” is encouraged in some situations.
 104
 If the home state doubts that the host state 
will be willing to cooperate to promote human rights, this section of the FRD allows an 
exception from the duty to cooperate. The measure enacted by the home state is a domestic 
measure, intending to regulate and influence the actions of the domestic corporation, 
thereby improving the general human rights performance of the home state and its actors. 
Cooperation would not only promote greater unity and respect among states, but it could 
also make the international human rights protection more effective, as the substantive and 
procedural measures are products of combined efforts and negotiations. 
 
Human rights treaties often call for international cooperation to achieve full realization of 
the human rights recognized in the treaty.
105
 The cooperation demanded by the human 
rights treaties particularly and explicitly requires positive assistance in ensuring full 
enjoyment of the rights. The host state may also be obligated to accept assistance to respect 
and protect human rights, even if the enacting state by doing so, encroaches on its 
sovereignty. The importance of this cross-border cooperation has been expressed 
repeatedly, particularly in relation to economic, social and cultural rights and human rights 
standards.
106
 In fact, failing to allow such cooperation would be a violation of the treaty 
duties towards the other states. As for regulating corporate activities abroad, it is not only 
permitted but also strongly encouraged, as long as the actions taken are consistent with the 
UN Charter and other relevant principles of international law.
107
 
 
Nevertheless, by including the other affected states in the legislation process for human 
rights regulations, future disagreements and problems could be avoided. By adhering to the 
duty to cooperate, the home state could perhaps avoid enacting measures with adverse 
effects on the host state and the contractors, assuming that a multilateral regulation would 
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find a way to avoid such problems without making the human rights requirements more 
lenient. The measure might cause difficulties and hardship in the host state, which the 
home state might fail to consider when implementing the measure on its own. The 
contractors in the host state may experience economic problems, as the requirements could 
lead to disinvestment and less corporate activity in the host state. Undermining enterprises 
will in turn cause less financial development, which is likely to inhibit other development 
and the general economical progress of the host state.  
 
3.4 Conclusion 
In this chapter, the extra-territorial effects the procedural and substantive measures will 
have in host states were addressed. These may be perceived as intrusive and in some cases 
even as in violation of the exclusive territorial jurisdiction and sovereignty of the host state. 
However, the objective of the measure is to promote human rights protection, which is a 
shared obligation and of interest to all states.  
 
According to the duty to cooperate, international and important decisions and regulations 
should be discussed with the other states. Yet, if it is likely that the measure will not be 
accepted by host states, the home state is permitted to take unilateral actions to promote 
fundamental human rights, in spite of the duty to cooperate. 
 
 33 
4 WTO 
4.1 Human Rights Concerns Under the WTO  
Domestic regulations in the home state regarding the respect and protection of human 
rights throughout the corporate chain of production will naturally have effects on its trade 
relations with other states. If the suppliers and subcontractors in a host state are unable to 
meet the requirements demanded by the domestic corporation due to measures imposed by 
the home state, the domestic corporation might terminate or restrict its business with them 
in order to fulfill the regulations at home. The effect of this is obvious; international trade 
between the corporations in the two states will be limited and the human rights levels in the 
host state will soon deteriorate, along with its rate of social and economic development. 
This effect stands in stark contrast to the objective of the WTO, which is to achieve 
economic efficiency and equality between states and “optimal use of the world’s 
resources”.
108
 
 
The WTO and the UN human rights agreements have their roots from the very beginning of 
the post-WWII era, and they have developed side by side since then, yet they make little or 
no notice of each other. In the discussion of the relationship between trade and human 
rights, many have focused on the lack of hierarchy in international law, on the equality of 
fundamental principles in trade law and in human rights law, and on the major impact they 
have had on international relations and development, albeit mainly in separate areas.
109
 The 
challenge of combining trade and human rights lies in tangling out which principles should 
be prioritized when the interests conflict. While different, the two areas represent aims 
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from the UN Charter,
110
 and legally, neither has an inherently stronger or more superior 
position than the other. Additionally, the fragmentation of international law affects them 
and the basic principles in the two areas differ significantly.111  
 
However, as both systems govern the relations and regulations of inter-state activity, there 
is bound to be some interaction between the two areas of law, especially considering that all 
WTO members are party to one or more human rights treaties.
112
 Both human rights 
treaties and the trade agreements continue to grow and evolve as their environment 
changes.
113
 International human rights standards, such as labor rights, and international 
trade policy can potentially be combined in the WTO trading system without dealing with 
fair trade or race to the bottom rationales.
114
 The WTO recognizes that when states enter 
into “reciprocal and mutually advantageous arrangements” to reduce major barriers to and 
discriminatory treatment in international trade relations, the arrangement is likely to be 
beneficial to several areas of international cooperation and co-existence.
115
  
 
In this chapter, the possible trade restrictive effects of a procedural or substantive measure 
will be examined. The measure will be examined under the National Treatment principle in 
GATT art. III, and also under the general exceptions clause in GATT art. XX. Finally, the 
regulation will be examined according to the Agreement on Technical Barriers to Trade 
(TBT). 
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4.2 National Treatment principle - GATT 1994 art. III 
4.2.1 Introduction to the National Treatment Principle 
The National Treatment (NT) principle
116
 prohibits differential treatment of domestic and 
foreign like products through internal taxes and regulatory measures so as to afford 
protection
117
 to the domestic products. Treating imports consistently and equally with 
domestic products is a fundamental principle in international trade law, and can be 
achieved by avoiding protectionist and discriminatory behavior with minimal restrictions 
and limitations on international trade.
118
  
 
According to the NT, WTO member states cannot impose any internal tariffs or other 
domestic barriers to trade, such as internal regulations, that might restrict or limit 
international trade in a discriminatory manner, unless such regulation is necessary to 
achieve a justifiable goal.
119
 A domestic measure imposing an obligation on domestic 
corporations to require specific human rights standards from their supply chains could 
interfere with the realization of this principle, as the consequences of the measure could be 
very different for foreign and national manufacturers. The NT promotes free trade by 
ensuring equal trade conditions and the same treatment for all member states, judging 
compliance by comparing the treatment given to domestic and foreign like products. The 
focus in this thesis is on a domestic regulation possibly causing differential treatment of 
foreign products, excluding internal taxes and other charges from the discussion.
120
 
 
Under the NT equal or better treatment of foreign products would also be acceptable. Art. 
III: 4 requires that all national or imported like products, regardless of their origin, “shall be 
accorded treatment no less favourable to that of national products (…)”; the laws, 
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regulations and requirements in the importing state should not obstruct such treatment.
121
 
The human rights requirement imposed on the domestic corporations by the home state 
does not differentiate between products from foreign or national chains of production, and 
seems to be in accordance with the NT. However, there is a line to be drawn between de 
jure and de facto discrimination; a measure can be discriminatory despite making the same 
demands of corporations with national and foreign supply chains, as the same measure 
could have different effects due to dissimilar situations in the states.  
 
In US – Gasoline, the Panel responded to an argument made by the US that a measure 
already found to be inconsistent with the NT in art. III: 4, does not have to be re-examined 
under the general provision in art. III: 1 to be deemed in violation of the principle.
122
 This 
specific provision in art. III: 4 concerns products from different territories, and as 
applicable, it should be considered first. The term “less favourable treatment” in art. III: 4 
was later interpreted by the Appellate Body [AB] to be a reiteration of the principle in art. 
III:1 requiring that domestic measures should not be implemented “so as to afford 
protection” to domestic products, and a separate analysis is therefore not required.
123
 The 
argument will presume that the enacted human rights requirement is origin-neutral, as 
origin-based regulations are clear violations of the non-discrimination principles. 
 
The following discussion will be structured according to art. III: 4. As the provision is 
applicable only if a regulation differentiates between “like products”, it must first be 
established whether the products affected by the human rights measure are “like”. The next 
step will be to determine whether the measure implements “less favorable treatment” for 
like products originating in a host state compared to national products. Procedural and 
substantive measures demand different standards, constituting differential treatment on 
different bases, and will therefore be examined individually.  
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4.2.2 Like Products 
In order to determine whether domestic regulations regarding human rights in suppliers and 
subcontractors are in conflict with GATT art. III: 4, it is necessary to determine whether the 
products from corporations with foreign or domestic supply chains are “like products”, and 
whether the levels of human rights protection affect this likeness. The term “like products” 
is used in many of the GATT provisions, and in each article it must be interpreted 
contextually and according to the object and purpose of the article.
124
 Although the likeness 
of products is determined on a case-by-case basis, the similar terminology in GATT art. I 
and art. III: 4 allow for a comparable general interpretation of “like products”.
125
 
 
In the findings of the AB in EC-Asbestos, four general criteria were applied to analyze 
likeness between products: their physical properties, their end uses, consumers’ habits and 
tastes in relation to them, and their tariff classification.
126
 This is not a closed list of 
applicable characteristics, but merely a list of acknowledged tools for analyzing and 
applying the provision.
127
 For the purposes here, most of these criteria will be inapplicable, 
as the regulation focuses on products that are otherwise like, but that come from contractors 
with divergent human rights protection.  
 
The physical properties of the product will not be altered by varying degrees of regulation, 
and here it is assumed that they are such that they will not render the products unalike. Nor 
will differences between the products be expressed by the products’ end uses, as the human 
rights regulation is unlikely to have any effect on this. A similar assumption must be made 
in relation to the tariff classification, which will also be excluded from the following 
discussion of whether the products are like. 
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Varying levels of human rights protection in the supply chains may, however, affect the 
consumers’ tastes and habits in relation to the products. Two products in a competitive 
relationship in the marketplace usually remain alike even if they have gone through 
different production processes, especially if these are not related to the product.
128
 
However, this may not be the case with human rights regulations, due to the compelling 
reasoning behind the regulation of the process and the moral differences between products 
manufactured under human rights friendly or violating conditions.
129
 A product from a 
chain of production where human rights are respected and protected could be considered 
significantly different from another produced under abhorrent conditions, and the two 
would no longer be considered “like products”.  
 
In order for consumers to consider such circumstances when developing their preferences, 
knowledge or easy access to information about the differences is required. Especially 
where serious safety, health or life concerns arise, consumer awareness of differences 
between otherwise like products has increased.
130
 Although the concerns in earlier cases 
were directly related to the product, they are representative of a general trend. In addition, 
attempts made to distinguish between the product and the production methods have been 
subject to much criticism, as a limitation based on process and production methods [PPMs] 
can be just as discriminatory and trade restrictive as limitations based on the product 
itself.
131
  
 
Information about the human rights conditions in the various supply chains may also affect 
the consumers’ tastes and habits. The knowledge that one product was made using child 
labor or manufactured under very poor working conditions may easily affect the 
consumers’ choices, causing them to take ethical differences and social costs into 
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consideration. A good approach to promote consumer awareness could be to implement a 
mechanism that certifies corporations, their supply chains and the products that fulfill 
certain standards.  
 
By certifying and labeling products manufactured according to regulations concerning 
human rights protection and promotion, consumers will be better informed and their tastes 
and habits may be influenced. However, the preferences of the consumers might not be 
influenced to the degree of affecting or changing the likeness of the products, and it is 
unclear exactly how clear the consumers’ tastes and habits must be. The consumers may 
not agree on the same preferences, making it difficult to determine whether the products are 
like or not.
132
  However, if there is no clear tendency regarding the likeness of otherwise 
like products based on the different human rights regulation, the products must be assumed 
to remain like. When discussing the consumers’ tastes and habits, the focus is on the 
current situation, but possible latent alterations are also of interest.
133
 Such latent 
preferences may surface if information becomes more freely available to the consumers.  
 
4.2.3 No Less Favourable Treatment  
4.2.3.1 General 
The NT prohibits differential treatment of otherwise like products of national or foreign 
origin.
134
 Having established the limits of like and unlike products, the next step is to 
determine whether a human rights measure will amount to “less than favourable treatment” 
in relation to like products from foreign supply chains compared to products from national 
supply chain.  
 
                                                
132
 EC – Asbestos (Panel) para. 8.139. 
133
 Korea - Alcoholic Beverages (AB), para. 116. 
134
 GATT art. III: 4 
 40 
Regulations explicitly based on the origin of the products are clear violations of the non-
discrimination principle. Otherwise, a procedural requirement could freely be imposed on 
domestic corporations, but waived for those with national supply chains. The home state 
could base this on its assumed knowledge regarding the human rights standards in national 
corporations, or it could base the waiver on a pre-existing reporting requirement for 
national corporate actors.
135
 A real dispensation would be in conflict with the NT, as it 
would complicate having foreign supply chains compared to getting products from 
domestic contractors and suppliers.  
 
In the following, the assumption will therefore be that the procedural and substantive 
regulations
136
 are origin-neutral measures. The human rights measures should accord “no 
less favourable” treatment to domestic corporations with foreign chains of production than 
those with national supply chains. However, such differential treatment does not have to be 
intentional or explicit; requirements enacted by the home state regarding the human rights 
levels in subcontractors and suppliers may be origin-neutral, treating like products with 
different origins the same, yet the effect could be discriminatory due to unlike human rights 
conditions in the host and home states, causing the measures to be considered de facto 
discriminatory.137  
4.2.3.2 Procedural Requirement 
The suggested procedural human rights measures impose the same duties on domestic 
corporations with foreign supply chains and on domestic corporations with domestic 
suppliers and contractors, and do not explicitly discriminate between them. Procedural 
measures that require corporations to obtain information from their suppliers and 
subcontractors regarding the human rights performance, would not represent any particular 
problems for those with national supply chains, as the domestic subcontractors and 
suppliers would also be required to abide by the same regulation.  
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However, for domestic corporations with foreign supply chains, the implementation of the 
measure could be demanding and difficult, as information may be less accessible in the 
host state. The contractors and suppliers may be unwilling or unable to comply with the 
requirements due to the costs involved, or due to conflicting legislation in the host state.
138
 
The enacted treatment could thus be de facto discriminatory
139
 in favor of national products 
as the regulation disregards the differences between the pre-existing human rights 
protection in the host and home states, making the obligation more demanding on 
corporations with foreign supply chains. Whether this measure amounts to differential 
treatment will also depend on the exact nature of the regulation, as it could range from 
requiring that the domestic corporations request information from their subcontractors, to 
requiring that they make their “best effort” to obtain information, or to demanding specific 
information and reports concerning the observance of human rights. 
 
To meet their NT obligation, states must not only refrain from imposing explicitly 
discriminatory regulations, but also ensure that the imported and domestic like products 
have equal competitive conditions.
140
 Procedural measures should not cause extensive 
difficulties or result in domestic corporations choosing national suppliers and contractors 
over contractors in a host state, as the measures will rely mainly on the domestic 
corporation and less on the situation and regulations in the various host states.  
 
Depending on the nature of the human rights measure, the effort and resources required to 
meet the information requirement will vary. The concern is that the procedural requirement 
will demand too much of a corporation with a foreign supply chain, where information is 
no easily available, making the requirement problematic and burdensome. This could cause 
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the domestic corporation to choose national contractors instead, amplifying that the 
treatment favors national chains of production in violation of art. III: 4.  
 
4.2.3.3 Substantive Requirements 
If a home state demands that certain human rights standards and specific regulations are 
maintained by domestic corporations in contracts with suppliers and subcontractors abroad, 
the NT requires that the same standards and other requirements should be imposed on 
corporations with domestic supply chains.
141
 In order to accord “no less favourable 
treatment” to the products from the foreign supply chain, the home state cannot demand a 
higher degree of human rights compliance from domestic corporations with foreign chains 
of production than from those who have domestic contractors and suppliers. For instance, 
in order to prohibit the use of child labor throughout the chains of production abroad, the 
home state must also abolish child labor domestically.
142
  
 
A substantive requirement could entail that the home state imposes a prohibition on using 
subcontractors and suppliers that violate human rights. In order to comply with art. III: 4, 
the same regulation would have to be imposed in relation to both domestic and foreign 
subcontractors. For a domestic corporation without any foreign contractors, a substantive 
human rights measure will presumably be fairly straightforward to implement, as the home 
state is likely to already have control over the human rights standards adhered to by 
corporate actors within its jurisdiction. The human rights requirement will be binding for 
both small and big businesses, indicating that the contractors and suppliers too are 
responsible for respecting and protecting the same human rights as the domestic 
corporation.  
 
The effort required for a corporation with foreign suppliers and contractors to meet the 
substantive requirements, will often demand far more resources than from a corporation 
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with a domestic supply chain, especially when the suppliers and subcontractors are located 
in host states with poor human rights protection. Such substantive human rights 
requirements throughout the chain of production could easily constitute differential 
treatment if the required human rights standards and norms are too peripheral or specific 
for the home state, while requirements based on fundamental and basic human rights 
norms, which all states agree to or are bound by, might more easily be accepted as “no less 
favourable treatment”. 
 
4.3 General Exceptions - GATT art. XX  
4.3.1 Introduction 
Internal regulation of corporate adherence to human rights norms throughout the chain of 
production could be a violation of the non-discrimination principles
143
 under the WTO.
144
 
However, such regulation might still be permissible according to the GATT art. XX. The 
general exceptions clause permits the adoption of some regulations despite trade 
restrictiveness, as long as the policy is legitimate according to the provisions in art. XX, 
and not applied in a discriminatory manner.
145
  
 
A two-tiered system has to be followed when applying art. XX: first, the regulation has to 
satisfy the exact provision in paragraph (a)-(j), and the connection between the regulation 
and the aim must also meet the standard of the provision. Second, the regulation must be 
applied in a manner consistent with the chapeau.
146
 The following argument will be 
structured according to this system, discussing the applicability of human rights regulations 
as general exceptions according to art. XX. 
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4.3.2 Human Rights in GATT art. XX (a), (b) and (e) 
The exceptions listed in art. XX are based on objectives considered to be of particular 
importance to the member states. States usually want to maintain domestic control over 
certain issues in dealings with other states.
147
 Some of the general exceptions may be 
applicable to the home state’s human rights requirement for domestic corporations and 
their suppliers and subcontractors. In US – Gasoline, the AB gave a broad interpretation of 
the measures that could be protected under art. XX (g),
148
 which has been applied in later 
cases under the same paragraph,
149
 and which could probably be extended to the other 
paragraphs under art. XX. 
 
Art. XX (a) allows states to implement measures that would otherwise be inconsistent with 
WTO principles of non-discrimination, such as the MFN or the NT, if the regulation 
adopted is “necessary to protect public morals”.
150
 This provision has never been 
interpreted in the context of a dispute settlement under the GATT, and many fear that the 
vagueness of the paragraph would enable states to disguise protectionist measures as valid 
regulations.
151
 It may be applied to prohibit imports in conflict with common perceptions of 
moral, such as weapons, drugs, child pornography, and other products that rely on the 
exploitation of children or others. A more normative interpretation of the term “public 
morals” leads to the fundamental norms of society, many of which are established in 
human rights laws, such as the right to life
152
, liberty and security of person,
153
 freedom of 
expression
154
. As the basic human rights treaties and the human rights that have become 
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customary law or jus cogens represent standards that very nearly all states agree on, it 
seems feasible to incorporate them into the exception in art. XX (a). It is often assumed that 
human rights are implicitly included under “public morals”,
155
 and the indivisibility of 
fundamental human rights invites the inclusion of all human rights.
156
 
 
The general exception in art. XX (b) permits states to implement otherwise trade restrictive 
measures, if these are “necessary to protect human (…) life or health”. Like art. XX (a), 
XX (b) is also a little vague and ambiguous concerning the exact content of an acceptable 
measure. The case law surrounding art. XX (b) demonstrates how the issues can be 
addressed.
157
 States have called upon the provision in several disputes, most of which 
concerned the use of specific materials or chemicals, creating risks and causing 
environmental and health related concerns in other member states.
158
  
 
Many human rights are directly related to human life or health, and will often be a natural 
part of the exceptions allowed under art. XX (b). The right to life
159
, the right not to be 
subjected to torture
160
, the right to liberty and security of person
161
, the right to food
162
 and 
the right to health
163
 are only some of the human rights that could be used in national 
human rights requirements in relation to the suppliers and subcontractors of the domestic 
corporations consistent with art. XX (b).  These rights are imperative for the protection and 
promotion of human life and health, and trade restrictive measures requiring adherence to 
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these rights should therefore be acceptable under art. XX(b).
164
 Other norms that are 
concerned with different aspects of human rights are more difficult to include under the 
same provision.
165
 Despite the differences between the pronounced aims of the various 
human rights, they are considered to be indivisible and interdependent, as the full 
protection and enjoyment of the individual right is closely linked to the enjoyment of other 
rights.
166
  
 
National regulations regarding the level of human rights in the subcontractor and suppliers 
of domestic corporations could also be allowed based on art. XX (e). The provision 
approves trade restrictive measures “relating to the products of prison labour”. This 
exception can be applied to prohibit the use of prison labor throughout the chain of 
production, or to demand certain guaranteed rights and freedoms for the prisoners, such as 
the right to water, food and health and freedom from slavery and forced labor. It can also 
be used to promote human rights in prisons generally, and to improve poor conditions and 
prohibit practices such as enslavement, political persecution and other human rights 
abuses.
167
 
 
4.3.3 Human Rights as General Exceptions 
All WTO members are party to one or more human rights treaties, and they have to abide 
by the various obligations, in addition to the applicable customary international law.
168
 The 
WTO dispute settlement bodies should take this into consideration when determining 
whether the trade restricting regulations are necessary and the objectives legitimate,
169
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giving additional support to exceptions based on non-WTO obligations. The human rights 
obligations of the states could be applied as arguments in a dispute on whether the state’s 
trade obligations are being fulfilled or violated.
170
  
 
A few basic human rights norms have become jus cogens, such as the prohibition of 
slavery, genocide, and child labor to mention some, and more human rights will 
presumably be recognized as jus cogens in the future.
171
 Jus cogens rules are peremptory 
customary international laws, which prevail over all customary law and treaty norms.
172
 
Accordingly, a state cannot refrain from complying with jus cogens norms even under 
WTO laws, and a domestic regulation to enforce peremptory human rights norms 
throughout the chain of production should be accepted as an exception to the non-
discrimination principles in the WTO.  
 
It can also be argued that basic human rights have achieved the status of obligations erga 
omnes,
 173
 as discussed above.
174
 “The principles and rules concerning the basic rights of 
the human person” were found to be obligations erga omnes, such as rights derived from 
“the outlawing of acts of aggression, and of genocide, and also from the principles and 
rules concerning the basic rights of the human person, including protection from slavery 
and racial discrimination”.
175
 In principle, all human rights are equal and interdependent, 
yet some rights are considered to be of a more fundamental character,
176
 and states are 
given a right to prosecute inconsistencies and violations.
177
 These fundamental human 
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rights could be given preferential treatment in international disputes over conflicting 
provisions of treaties, such as trade agreements.  
 
Although there are many arguments in favor of allowing trade restrictive measures based 
on human rights, the exclusion of rights terminology from the WTO was intentional.
178
 In 
US – Shrimp, the AB found that the chapeau to art. XX does not allow exclusions for 
unilateral trade measures aiming to protect the global environment.
179
 Exceptions must be 
based in the provisions provided under GATT art. XX, and while not explicitly mentioned 
human rights may be implicitly included as relevant and within the scope of the general 
exceptions provisions. Accepting exceptions based on concerns beyond the jurisdiction of 
the states might lead to abuses of the general exceptions provision. Additionally, unilateral 
trade restrictive measures based on human rights requirements would be problematic 
because they will shift the focus from the important common values and objectives to fears 
of protectionism and discrimination. 
 
4.3.4 The Degree of Connection 
The ten general exception provisions in art. XX require a certain level of connection 
between the objective pursued and the trade restrictive measure enacted, albeit the 
terminology and the degree of connection may vary.
180
 The different terms used in the 
various paragraphs of the article relate to different relationships between the regulation and 
the pursued policy.
181
 
 
Art. XX (e) merely demands that the measure must be “related to prison labour” [emphasis 
added], a lesser degree of connection than what is found in the other paragraphs examined 
                                                
178
 Eres (2004), Howse and Mutua (2000) at 5 
179
 US – Shrimp (AB) paras. 115-116, 168 
180
 US – Gasoline (AB) p.17 
181
 US – Gasoline (AB) p. 22 
 49 
here. Trade restrictive measures related to prison labor will therefore generally be accepted, 
as long as they are also consistent with the chapeau to art. XX. Incorporating human rights 
requirements into this exception should not cause any particular difficulties. Whether the 
enacted measure constitutes a procedural or a substantive regulation, the connection to the 
aim will be as close as required by the provision and the measure should be acceptable. 
 
Art. XX (a) and (b) both demand that the measure is necessary to achieve the intended aim. 
If the human rights measure fulfills the necessity requirement, it must also be consistent 
with the chapeau to art. XX.
182
 In EC-Asbestos, the AB discussed the necessity 
requirement in relation to the protection of human life and health. The AB declared that 
“the more vital or important the common interests or values pursued, the easier it would be 
to accept as ‘necessary’ measures designed to meet those ends.”
183
 EC-Asbestos focused on 
the protection of human life and health in relation to the use of certain chemicals and 
material. Nevertheless, the findings could also be applied to a case where the concern is 
related to other vital common interests or values such as human rights. 
 
Domestic human rights regulation regarding the compliance of subcontractors throughout 
the chain of production might not be easily accepted, as the aim of the regulation is to 
improve corporate human rights compliance. The measure is effective only if such changes 
do occur. The human rights measures do not necessarily work the way the home state 
planned, and instead of eliminating or reducing poor human rights practices, these 
measures simply cause a redistribution of production within the host country.
184
 The 
contractors with good human rights records will contract with corporations from the 
regulating country, while the other contractors with bad or insufficient adherence to human 
rights norms will supply companies in other less concerned states instead.
185
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In necessity discussions the focus is generally on the home state and the effectiveness of 
the trade restrictive measure there. However, the human rights measures have a different 
objective, as they aim to affect the human rights protection through the horizontal 
application between the domestic corporation and its contractors. The states’ obligation to 
respect and protect human rights includes ensuring that its subjects respect the rights of one 
another. This horizontality is not limited by the borders of the states, but by the 
relationships between the various actors, and in order to enforce it efficiently, internal 
measures regarding the human rights level throughout the supply chain may be required. 
The AB in EC – Asbestos conditioned the necessity of a measure on the lack of a 
“reasonably available alternative”
186
 that could protect the same interests and values in a 
less trade restrictive manner.  
 
Procedural regulations requiring that the domestic corporations obtain and provide 
information on the human rights conditions throughout the supply chain are only 
moderately trade restrictive. These measures may not directly protect the aims provided in 
the general exceptions in art. XX (a) and (b), but through their implementation the home 
state is able to prohibit human rights violations by its corporate actors, which perhaps will 
lead to improvements in the human rights situation. 
 
Substantive measures impose distinct and explicit human rights standards on the domestic 
corporations and their suppliers and subcontractors. Such standards demand that the 
individual contractor maintains a certain level of human rights protection, a requirement 
that can easily become trade restrictive, quite possibly more than necessary.
187
 Procedural 
measures would presumably be less trade restrictive, however, they would also be less 
effective in protecting human rights. It could also be argued that trade regulation is an 
inappropriate application for human rights regulations, and that it would be better to pursue 
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these aims through treaties and human rights organizations where they might be less trade 
restrictive. However, despite the long tradition of keeping trade and human rights separate, 
it could also be argued that their objectives and basic principles must be examined together 
in order to achieve a satisfactory solution to the conflicting issues. 
 
An alternative approach could be to allow states to implement domestic regulations 
regarding their companies’ use of contractors, despite the trade restricting effects, for 
instance by amending Article XX of the GATT to include a universal human rights 
exception or by an expansive interpretation of the public morals exception.
 188 
Upon 
fulfilling the necessity requirement, the chapeau of Article XX prohibiting arbitrary or 
unjustifiable discrimination or disguised restrictions on trade, will also have to be satisfied. 
 
4.3.5 Manner of Application 
The final analysis of the measure can be found in the preamble to art. XX. It demands that 
the trade restrictive measure, upon having fulfilled the demands regarding the scope and 
connection in the individual provision, should not be “applied in a manner which would 
constitute a means of arbitrary or unjustifiable discrimination between countries where the 
same conditions prevail or a disguised restriction on international trade”.
189
 
 
Trade regulations based on only one state’s legislation carry a high risk of constituting a 
disguised form of protectionism; such as in Japan - Alcoholic Beverages, where the 
internal regulations were used to create separate origin-neutral tax categories for imported 
alcoholic beverages. The regulations were based on the ingredients and alcohol content, 
adapted to differentiate between Japanese and imported liqueurs.
190
 The taxes were found 
to be in violation of NT, demonstrating the importance of being clear on the legitimacy of 
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the reasoning behind any such regulation.
191
 With a human rights argument supporting the 
measures, this is particularly important, as it can be very difficult to contradict, giving the 
home state an additional incentive to use human rights concerns not due to real interest and 
aims, but merely as a pretext for limiting trade.  
 
On the other hand, states tend to take issue with measures that are imposed unilaterally by 
one state, especially since they typically concern matters of international importance, which 
governments often desire to have some input on before a multilateral decision is reached.
192
 
Developing countries are particularly concerned about developed states invoking human 
rights as a rationale for their trade restrictive measures, as it strips them of their advantage 
of having low labor costs, and instead imposes additional requirements on them demanding 
human rights adherence if they want to continue trading with the developed states.
193
 By 
using human rights regulations, a home state can easily discriminate against a number of 
host states with cheap labor and products, based on their poor human rights protection. This 
will especially affect developing countries where the budgets are limited, forcing them to 
choose between human rights protection and economic development.  
 
In US – Shrimp, the AB interpreted the preambular text of art. XX to contain an important 
balancing requirement for general exceptions. When interpreting and applying the 
exceptions in art. XX, it found that a balance should be maintained between a member 
state’s right to invoke a legitimate exception and its duty to respect the treaty rights and 
trade concessions of other states.
194
 The decision in US – Shrimp emphasizes that any 
differential treatment should reflect the rationale for the regulation, so as to prove that the 
measure is not merely disguised protectionism.
195
 The human rights regulation might be an 
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attempt by the home state to ensure that the domestic suppliers and subcontractors remain 
realistic competitors to the foreign subcontractors, protecting the domestic supply chains 
from the low costs and labor standards in the foreign supply chains, under the guise of 
promoting human rights. This would constitute a disguised restriction on trade, and would 
be inconsistent with the chapeau in art. XX. 
 
The balance between the measure and the trade restrictiveness has to be determined on a 
case-by-case basis, according to the aim and scope of the measure and the limitation to the 
other states’ rights, ensuring an even-handed application of such measures.
196
 
 
4.4 TBT- Agreement 
4.4.1 Introduction 
The Agreement on Technical Barriers to Trade (TBT) regulates which important measures 
a state can implement, trying to ensure that they are not arbitrary or unnecessary obstacles 
to trade in goods.
197
 In EC – Asbestos, the AB noted that “although the TBT Agreement is 
intended to ‘further the objectives of GATT 1994’, it does so through a specialized legal 
regime that applies solely to a limited class of measures.  For these measures, the TBT 
Agreement imposes obligations on Members that seem to be different from, and additional 
to, the obligations imposed on Members under the GATT 1994.” 198 (Emphasis in original) 
This observation demonstrates that the two agreements are not exclusive, and can be 
applied to the same measures.  
 
While the TBT is considered lex specialis, and will prevail in the case of a conflict with the 
GATT, another conclusion that can be drawn from EC – Asbestos is that a measure found 
to be inconsistent with either one, will not be repaired with consistency in the other, as they 
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are cumulative and impose different obligations on the states.
199
 The TBT preamble 
acknowledges the importance of technical regulations and standards to ensure efficient and 
consistent production systems and to “facilitate the conduct of international trade.
200
 The 
technical regulations enacted by the states should not be more trade restrictive than 
necessary to fulfill a legitimate objective.
 201
 However, the TBT does not contain a general 
exception provision like GATT, but is presumed that the connection between of the two 
allow for a similar exception to be added to the TBT by interpretation.  
 
The following subsections will examine whether the suggested human rights measures are 
in violation of the national treatment principle, whether they constitute technical 
regulations, and whether they are necessary obstacles to trade, and finally whether they 
protect a legitimate objective.  
 
4.4.2 Non-Discrimination 
Possible conflicts between the human rights regulation imposed by the home state and the 
rules in the TBT will, as under the GATT, arise in relation to the NT and the MFN 
principles. As above, the focus here will remain on the NT, as the measure enacted by the 
home state must require the same human rights protection from the domestic corporations, 
regardless of whether the product was produced in a domestic or foreign supply chain.
202
 
The discussion of whether the measure is discriminatory or not, will not be considered 
further here, as it would be nearly identical to the discussion under GATT art. III: 4.
203
 
 
The regulation imposed on domestic corporations to promote human rights throughout their 
chain of production could restrict the imports of the home state, causing an obstacle to 
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trade. However, not all barriers to trade should be hindered, as there are certain objectives 
of greater importance than restrictions on trade.
204
  
4.4.3 Technical Regulations 
Domestic regulations requiring human rights compliance throughout the chain of 
production might not sound like typical “technical regulations”. Most of the regulations 
examined under to this provision, concern classic technical issues, such as the type and 
amount of chemicals used in a product, and the impact this has on the environment during 
and after production.
205
 However, the definition of technical regulations found in Annex 1 
to the TBT calls for a “[d]ocument which lays down product characteristics or their related 
processes and production methods, including the applicable administrative provisions, with 
which compliance is mandatory.”
206
  
 
The human rights requirement enacted by the home state is a mandatory regulation 
imposed on the domestic corporations and their supply chains, as opposed to the existing 
voluntary initiatives for corporations.
207
 If the regulation is not complied with, the product 
in question will not be allowed access to the markets in the home state. The human rights 
measures, whether procedural or structural, impose certain processes and production 
methods in terms of human rights standards on the corporations, but do not demand that the 
products have any other specific characteristics.  
 
The definition of technical regulations in Annex 1 explicitly allows technical regulations 
that prescribe specific PPMs that are related to the product. There is, however, no mention 
of non-product related process and production methods [NPR-PPMs], and the TBT has 
been presumed to be inapplicable in relation to these regulations. It has been argued that 
there is some ambiguity in the definition that may permit NPR-PPMs in certain instances, 
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as administrative provisions are included with the PPMs.
208
 A technical regulation should 
normally refer to an identifiable product or PPM, as the technical requirements will vary 
depending on the character of the product. However, the AB in EC Asbestos found a 
general regulation concerning “all products” to be unproblematic.
209
 Accordingly, the fact 
that the human rights measure imposed by the home state on all supply chains does not 
differentiate between various products, will not affect the regulation’s character.  
 
4.4.4 Necessity  
Art. 2.2 of the TBT requires that the technical regulation does not create an unnecessary 
obstacle to international trade.
210
 Unlike the prerequisite concerning connection in the 
various provisions of GATT art. XX,
211
 the necessity requirement in TBT art. 2.2 is an 
additional positive obligation that must be present for a measure to be acceptable under the 
NT.
212
 
  
Regulations that require corporations to demonstrate compliance with human rights norms 
throughout the supply chain represent a type of regulation that can easily be trade 
restrictive if it becomes too demanding. In order to determine whether the domestic 
measure to protect and promote human rights is an unnecessary obstacle to trade, 
alternative approaches that might be less-trade restrictive should be considered.
213
 A 
relevant concern is whether trade regulations are the right legal instruments for addressing 
cross-border human rights, as advancing human rights protection through the corporate 
chain of production may seem somewhat inappropriate compared to using international 
human rights treaties or other voluntary initiatives.  
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A procedural measure regarding an active or passive information requirement may fulfill 
the necessity requirement, as it is difficult to imagine a less trade restrictive measure. In 
addition the transparency requirement in TBT art. 10 demands that all members provide 
full information on their technical regulations. Human rights regulations could easily be 
implemented as part of the transparency system, which may make it more feasible for 
domestic corporations with foreign supply chains to provide information for the home state, 
which in turn will further reduce the trade restrictiveness. 
 
Next to the procedural measures, it might be difficult to demonstrate that the substantive 
measures do not constitute unnecessary obstacles to trade, as the procedural measures 
almost always will be less trade restrictive and less obstructing. However, the substantive 
measures could be more effective than the procedural measures in achieving substantial 
improvements in the human rights protection throughout the corporate chains of 
production. 
 
4.4.5 Human Rights As A Legitimate Objective 
The NT in the TBT requires that the trade restrictive regulation enacted by the home state 
promotes a legitimate objective.
214
 Art. 2.2 includes a list of such objectives, which 
contains various important public interest objectives that the member states should be 
allowed to protect independent of their trade obligations.
215
 Human rights are not explicitly 
included among them, but unlike the general exceptions clause in GATT art. XX, the list of 
legitimate objectives here is not exclusive, as the words “inter alia” demonstrate. States 
may therefore invoke other legitimate objectives too to justify trade restrictive technical 
regulations.
216
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Due to the similarities between the public interest objectives listed in the provision and 
human rights concerns, it can be argued that human rights should be considered among the 
legitimate objectives. On the other hand, human rights regulations were not amongst the 
technical regulations the members to the WTO intended to regulate when they negotiated 
the TBT agreement.
217
 The developing state parties to the WTO are also known to be 
skeptical of implementing human rights norms into international trade regulations, as they 
fear that it will make them vulnerable to protectionist trade measures disguised as human 
rights concerns.
218
 
 
Another option would be to interpret the objectives explicitly listed as legitimate, such as 
“protection of human health or safety”. It could be interpreted to include certain human 
rights, and as under GATT art. XX (b), which protects “human (…) life or health”, all 
human rights could be included here too, due to their universal character and 
interdependency. This application can be easily defended based on the general theme of the 
objectives and the growth of human rights consideration in transnational corporate 
relations.
219
 The position human rights holds in international law, through treaties, 
customary law, jus cogens and erga omnes, also supports the argument.
220
 The original 
intent of the member states seems to include some human rights, although the traditional 
divide between trade law and human rights law is visible here too.
221
  
 
4.5 Conclusion 
When assessing the impact the human rights regulation will have on the home state’s trade 
relations, both the GATT and the TBT call for a balance between the trade restrictiveness 
and the legitimacy and value of the pursued aim. It may be difficult to determine whether 
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human rights regulations are implemented for protectionist reasons, but even assuming that 
the intention of the home state is legitimate, the enactment of such regulations can be 
questionable.  
 
The procedural and substantive measures suggested above
222
 will easily favor domestic 
products or products from states with similar legislation, and thereby violate the NT and 
MFN principles. However, the TBT and the GATT allow exceptions for states to enact 
measures that promote certain worthy objectives, which may also be applicable for the 
human rights regulations.  
                                                
222
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5 Conclusion 
This thesis has examined the situation of a home state that wishes to enact laws to regulate 
the human rights performance of a domestic corporation throughout the supply chain, 
including in contractors and subcontractors and other business partners abroad. A domestic 
regulation with human rights requirements for the corporate chain of production can 
interfere with the home state’s international relationships and multilateral obligations, 
particularly in relation to international trade and the host state’s sovereignty. This thesis has 
analyzed the legitimacy of the measure in relation to the host state’s sovereign rights, the 
duty to cooperate and the trade obligations of the home state. 
 
The suggested human rights measures are similar to the Helms-Burton Act, as they prohibit 
domestic corporations’ use of contractors and suppliers with poor human rights standards, 
giving cross-border application to the measure. Despite the similarities with the Helms-
Burton Act, the human rights regulation enacted by the home state does not violate 
international law.  
 
Usually, host states will not object to domestic regulations in a home state, but the human 
rights requirement imposed by the home state has intentional extraterritorial effects, aiming 
to improve the human rights performance of domestic corporations’ in their subcontractors 
and suppliers abroad. As the Helms-Burton Act example demonstrates, host states might 
object to regulations with extraterritorial effects adversely affecting their corporate actors, 
i.e. the suppliers and the subcontractors of the domestic corporation. The extra-territorial 
effects of the human rights regulation were found to be somewhat intrusive and 
questionable in relation to the exclusive territorial jurisdiction and sovereignty of the host 
state. However, the objective of promoting human rights advocates allowing the measure. 
The issue is of interest to all states, and the host state too has an obligation to promote 
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human rights. The duty to cooperate also allows exceptions from the duty in order to 
promote fundamental human rights. 
 
When assessing the impact the human rights regulation will have on the home state’s trade 
relations, both the GATT and the TBT call for a balance between the trade restrictiveness 
and the objective pursued. The discussion of the legitimacy of the human rights measure 
under the WTO principles demonstrated the difficult relationship between international 
trade regulations and human rights norms. The procedural and substantive measures 
suggested will easily favor domestic products or products from states with similar 
legislation, and thereby violate the NT and MFN principles. In fact, the regulation was 
deemed in violation of the non-discrimination principles of the GATT, as the differences in 
the PPMs were not enough to render the products from a human rights complying supply 
chain different from those produced under violations. Under the non-discrimination rules of 
the TBT, the measures would encounter similar difficulties.  
 
However, the general exceptions article offers opportunities to balance the human rights 
provisions with the fundamental trade principles. The TBT and the GATT allow exceptions 
for states to enact measures that promote certain worthy objectives, which may also be 
applicable for the human rights regulations. The fact that the states all share the human 
rights obligations under customary law and treaty law was found to give additional support 
to the argument that human rights regulations should be acceptable despite restricting trade. 
 
There are some limitations to which measures can reasonably be implemented, as the 
domestic corporation’s sphere of influence is limited, and there are also other issues to be 
considered before enacting such regulation. The efficiency of these measures and the 
effects in relation to developing countries are some of the things the home state should 
examine further before implementing regulations on the domestic corporations and their 
subcontractors. However, by making the domestic corporations responsible for the human 
rights conditions in subcontractors and suppliers, the burden on host states might be 
lightened, while improving the human rights standards for its nationals.  
 62 
 
Human rights have traditionally been dealt with as vertical obligations for states, based in 
international treaties. The horizontal application has much potential, and especially 
between actors with the ability to influence others, such as organizations and corporations. 
The voluntary initiatives have not been particularly effective, and national legislation may 
be a better option if approved on an international level. There are many strong arguments 
for allowing the domestic human rights regulations, but there are also many considerations 
opposing such measures. By taking these into account when establishing the scope and 
content of the measure, the home state’s regulation promoting human rights throughout the 
domestic corporations’ chains of production will be consistent with its international 
obligations. 
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